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CASENOTE
WHERE SEXUAL PRIVACY MEETS PUBLIC MORALITY: HOW
WILLIAMS V. KING IS INSTRUCTIVE FOR THE FOURTH
CIRCUIT IN APPLYING PUBLIC MORALITY AS A LEGITIMATE
STATE INTEREST AFTER LAWRENCE V. TEXAS
DOUGLAS E. NAUMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas1
purported to extend the recognition of an individual's fundamental
right of privacy into new territory. In over-turning the decision in
Bowers v. Hardwick,' Lawrence provided evidence of the Court's will-
ingness to place private, consensual, homosexual relationships on the
same footing as comparable heterosexual ones. Some predicted "the
end of all morals legislation"3 and a "massive disruption of the current
social order ' as a result of the Lawrence decision.5 However in Wil-
* B.S., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1984; M.B.A., Wake Forest
University, 1995; Mr. Nauman is a third year evening student at North Carolina Central Univer-
sity School of Law. Above all, thank you to my family, most especially my wife and daughter,
without whom little would be possible and nothing would be worthwhile. Also, a special thank
you to Michael J. Lewis, Esq, and David D. Daggett, Esq., for their trust, support, and counsel.
And finally, to Therese (1969-2006), whose memory shall always serve to remind me of the
virtue of humility.
1. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). (Lawrence involved the constitutionality of a
state statute that prohibited deviate sexual intercourse, including sodomy, with a member of the
same sex. The Court resolved Lawrence by determining that homosexuals were free, as adults,
to engage in private sexual conduct which is within the liberty of persons to choose, without
being punished as criminals. The Court reiterated that attempts by the State, or a court, to define
the meaning of a relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an
institution the law protects should be avoided. In overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, the Lawrence
Court focused on the Bowers Court's failure to appreciate the extent of liberty at stake when
statutes are enacted that seek to control personal relationships by criminalizing the conduct that
forms an integral part of those relationships. The Court held that the State cannot demean the
existence of individuals or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime).
2. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
3. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 599.
4. Id. at 591.
5. See Id. at 586-605. (Justice Scalia criticized the majority for its failure to adhere to stare
decisis in deciding Lawrence. Scalia saw the overruling of Bowers, in part, as the Court's aban-
donment of society's long-standing reliance on morality as a guiding principal of the rule of law.
Reiterating that the majority did not recognize homosexual sodomy as a fundamental right,
Scalia found that a legitimate state interest existed in the prohibition of certain forms of sexual
1
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liams v. King,6 the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Alabama refused to broadly apply Lawrence and found that
public morality remains a viable state interest in regulating sexual
conduct, heterosexual and homosexual alike.
Lawrence does not equate the recognition of homosexual privacy
rights with the abandonment of societal morality as a legitimate basis
for state legislation. The cultural intensity of the present sexual rights
debate, however, has the potential to overshadow this distinction.
Williams V is particularly important in providing an alternative basis
for understanding the Lawrence decision outside this charged context.
The Williams V court based its decision not on a broad-based analysis
of sexual privacy rights. Rather, they identified that a court's recogni-
tion of the privacy rights engendered by certain types of sexual rela-
tionships need not, in all instances, affect the acceptance of certain
types of sexual conduct. Far from abandoning morality on a broad
scale, the Williams V court identified that state legislation regulating
sexual conduct does not necessarily infringe upon the legitimacy of the
sexual relationship (and its concomitant privacy rights) the Lawrence
majority recognized. Williams V thus establishes a conduct-based ap-
proach to analyzing sexual privacy legislation post-Lawrence. Law-
rence itself described several conduct-based exceptions to its holding.
Williams V expands that list and provides courts with a basis for con-
tinued refinement of the Lawrence holding.
The United States Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, the federal dis-
trict courts of the Fourth Circuit, and the North Carolina state courts
have yet to directly apply the holding in Lawrence. Of the cases in
which these courts reference Lawrence, none have reached beyond
the express exclusions of the Supreme Court's holding regarding sex-
ual conduct involving minors,7 non-consensual or coercive conduct,8
behavior on moral grounds. Scalia concluded that when the Lawrence majority reached the
opposite conclusion, it was effectively signaling the end of all morals legislation.).
6. Williams v. King (hereinafter Williams V), 420 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (N.D. Ala. 2006).
7. See generally United States v. Peterson, 294 F. Supp. 2d 797 (D.S.C. 2003) (upholding
portion of Child Pornography Prevention Act prohibiting possession of child pornography on
computer and computer disks transported via interstate commerce against First and Fifth
Amendment challenges; the regulation of obscene materials involving actual children does not
interfere with privacy or free speech rights), affd, 145 Fed. Appx. 820 (4th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Whorley, 386 F. Supp. 2d 693 (E.D. Va. 2005) (affirming existence of compelling state
interest in regulation of obscene material involving minors transported via interstate commerce
where obscene emails and child pornography cartoons were downloaded to government office
computer); United States v. Sherr, 400 F. Supp. 2d 843 (D. Md. 2005) (finding no legitimate
privacy or free speech issues implicated by state regulation of sexually explicit materials involv-
ing minors posted to the Internet); State v. Clark, 588 S.E.2d 66 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (upholding
statutory rape provision of statue against Equal Protection challenge, the court reaffirms state's
interest in regulating sexual conduct of minors, whether or not such conduct is consensual),
discretionary rev. denied, 593 S.E.2d 81 (N.C. 2004); State v. Oakley, 605 S.E.2d 215 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2004) (involving charge of sexual activity by a substitute parent, court notes difference
2
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public conduct or prostitution.9 Williams V, provides an instructive
basis for the limits of Lawrence in cases involving conduct or relation-
ships beyond those express limitations.
This note first analyzes the case of Williams v. King (Williams V)
and its predecessors."0 Second, the note focuses on the historical de-
velopment of the constitutional right of privacy, particularly as it re-
lates to personal sexual conduct. Third, the note examines the holding
of Lawrence v. Texas. Lastly, with that background, this note analyzes
the potential significance of Williams v. King (Williams V) for courts
applying morality as a legitimate state interest after Lawrence v.
Texas.
II. THE CASE
In 1998, the State of Alabama amended the Alabama Code to make
the distribution of certain sexual devices a criminal offense.11 Six
plaintiffs brought an action seeking to enjoin the Attorney General of
the State of Alabama from enforcing the amended code.12 They con-
tended that "implementation of th[e] statute [would] infringe upon
their fundamental right to privacy and personal autonomy secured by
the United States Constitution."13 "The plaintiffs further argue[d]
that the challenged legislation d[id] not bear a reasonable relationship
to a proper legislative purpose. '"14
The United States District Court for the Northern District
between consensual adult sexual relationships and those involving minors), discretionary rev.
denied, 610 S.E.2d 386 (N.C. 2005); State v. Moore, 606 S.E.2d 127 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (involv-
ing statutory rape, court notes Lawrence decision did not extend to minors); and State v. Brown-
ing, 629 S.E.2d 299 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (involving statutory rape and indecent liberties with a
child, rejecting jury instruction for mistake of age defense argued for under Lawrence, noting
state's interest in regulating sexual conduct involving minors).
8. See generally State v. Pope, 608 S.E.2d 114 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (upholding solicitation
of crimes against nature statute, noting state's interest in regulation of public conduct and prosti-
tution), discretionary rev. denied, 612 S.E.2d 636 (N.C. 2005); and State v. Whiteley, 616 S.E.2d
576 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (upholding constitutionality of crimes against nature statute when coer-
cive or non-consensual prohibited sexual act involved, though the statute was misapplied in peti-
tioner's case).
9. See generally State v. Pope, 608 S.E.2d 114 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) discretionary rev. de-
nied, 612 S.E.2d 636 (N.C. 2005).
10. Williams v. Pryor (Williams 1), 41 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (N.D. Ala. 1999); Williams v. Pryor
(Williams 11), 240 F.3d 944 (11th Cir. 2001); Williams v. Pryor, (Williams i1) 220 F. Supp. 2d
1257 (N.D. Ala. 2002); Williams v. Morgan, (Williams IV), 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004).
11. ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2(a)(1) (1975) (amended 1998) ("It shall be unlawful for any
person to knowingly distribute, possess with intent to distribute, or offer or agree to distribute
any obscene material or any device designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation
of human genital organs for any thing of pecuniary value.".)
12. Williams v. Pryor (Williams 1), 41 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1260 (N.D. Ala. 1999).
13. Id.
14. Id.
3
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of Alabama framed the issue as: whether the plaintiffs' interest "[in]
us[ing] devices 'designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stim-
ulation of human genital organs' when engaging in lawful, private,
sexual activity" is an extension of the fundamental right of privacy.'5
The court found no constitutional precedent for extending the right of
privacy to encompass all private sexual conduct.16 Referring to the
fundamental rights analysis developed in Washington v. Glucksberg,"7
the court went on to find that there was no deeply rooted liberty inter-
est in the plaintiffs' use of sexual devices.
Having found no fundamental right at issue and thus no basis for a
strict scrutiny review of the statute, the court turned to the question of
whether the state had a rational basis to support the statutory restric-
tions in the distribution of sexual devices.' 8 The court held that effect-
ing a sense of public morality was a legitimate state objective.' 9
However, the court found that the statute as written was not rationally
related to the state's interest in preserving public morality."z The court
concluded that "innumerable measures far short of the absolute ban
on the distribution of sexual devices [set out in the statute] would
have accomplished the state's goals."21
On appeal, the plaintiff-appellees reiterated their argument that the
statute infringed upon their fundamental right of privacy. The plain-
tiffs challenged the constitutionality of the statute on its face and as
applied. 2 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit reviewed the district court's decision de novo on the constitution-
ality of the statute. The court first considered the district court's
rational basis analysis and found that they erred in determining that
the statute lacked a rational basis because "the [s]tate's interest in
public morality was a legitimate interest rationally served by the stat-
ute."2 3 The court next considered the plaintiffs' fundamental rights
arguments. The plaintiffs invoked the Supreme Court's recognition of
a constitutionally protected fundamental right to privacy, arguing that
the statute's restriction on the distribution of sexual devices infringed
on their fundamental "right to use" sexual devices.24
15. Id. at 1275.
16. Id. at 1283.
17. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) ("[W]e have regularly observed
that the Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are,
objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."').
18. Williams v. Pryor (Williams 1), 41 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1284 (N.D. Ala. 1999).
19. Id. at 1286.
20. Id. at 1288.
21. Id.
22. Williams v. Pryor (Williams 11), 240 F.3d 944, 952-53 (11th Cir. 2001).
23. Id. at 949.
24. Id. at 953.
4
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Framing the facial challenge as whether a constitutionally protected
right to privacy protects an individual's liberty to use sexual devices
when engaged in lawful, private, sexual activity, the court found that
there was no controlling precedent that established the facial uncon-
stitutionality of the statute.25 The court found that the Supreme
Court's recognition of such a privacy right had only extended to pri-
vate decisions not to procreate without government interference. 6
Because the statute under consideration had potential constitutional
applications, the court found that the district court had correctly re-
jected the plaintiff's facial challenge. 27
In regard to the as-applied challenge, the court found that the re-
cord was too narrow to permit a decision on whether the statute in-
fringed on the right to sexual privacy of the specific plaintiffs in the
case. 28 The court remanded the case for further consideration by the
district court.29
On remand from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the district
court considered whether the Alabama statute was unconstitutional as
applied to the individual plaintiffs in the case. The court employed
the two-part substantive due process analysis outlined in Glucksberg
to determine whether constitutional protection should be extended to
the plaintiffs' asserted right of privacy.3" Under this review of the
case, the court framed the issue as whether "the fundamental right to
privacy recognized by the Supreme Court incorporate[d] a fundamen-
tal right to sexual privacy between married persons and between un-
married persons which, in turn, 'encompasse[d] a right to use sexual
devices."' 31 Under this due process analysis, the plaintiffs' burden
was to demonstrate that such a right was deeply rooted in the nation's
history and traditions.32 After an exhaustive review of the history and
legal traditions related to sexual privacy in the United States, the
court found that such a right to sexual privacy existed.33
Finding that the right to use sexual devices was encompassed by an
individual's right to sexual privacy, the court turned to the question of
25. Id. at 954.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 955.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 956.
30. Williams v. Pryor, (Williams I1) 220 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1275 (N.D. Ala. 2002). "The first
feature of this test requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that the fundamental right alleged is, ob-
jectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition'...." Id. at 1275 (citing Moore v.
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503, (1977)). "The second part of the substantive due process test
requires that this court carefully describe the fundamental liberty interest at issue." Id. at 1275
(citing Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21).
31. Id. at 1277.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1296.
5
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whether Alabama's statutory ban on the distribution of such devices
"impermissibly burdened the plaintiffs' rights to sexual privacy."34
Under a strict scrutiny review, the court reasoned that any burden
imposed by the statute on the plaintiffs' right to sexual privacy "may
be justified only by [a] compelling state interest[ ] and must be nar-
rowly drawn to express only those interests."35 Noting that "a govern-
mental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject
to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnec-
essarily broadly," the court found that Alabama's ban on the sale or
distribution of sexual devices resulted in an impermissible burden on
their use.36 Applying the strict scrutiny standard, the court found that
Alabama's statute was not narrowly tailored to meet Alabama's pur-
ported interest in regulating obscenity.37 Moreover, even if the state
had a compelling interest in regulating obscenity generally, the court
questioned whether that interest was compelling in the context of a
ban on sexual devices carried out simply because the state "abhor[red]
'the commerce of sexual stimulation and auto-eroticism, for its own
sake, unrelated to marriage, procreation, or familial relationships.' 38
On appeal for a second time by the State of Alabama, the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether the statute, as applied,
violated a fundamental right protected under the Constitution.39 This
was the first time the appeals court had considered the case since the
decision in Lawrence v. Texas.
The court of appeals characterized the case as one involving a "hith-
erto unarticulated fundamental right."4 ° The court declined to read
the Lawrence decision as creating a fundamental sexual privacy right.
Instead, the court argued that rather than establishing a fundamental
sexual privacy right, the Lawrence court had in fact declined to do so,
stating that "the [Supreme] Court has never indicated that the mere
fact that an activity [wa]s sexual and private entitle[d] it to protection
as a fundamental right."'" The court interpreted the holding in Law-
rence as only establishing the unconstitutionality of a criminal prohibi-
tion on consensual adult sodomy.42 Primary among its reasons was
the fact that the Supreme Court had applied a rational basis analysis
when deciding Lawrence. The court of appeals reasoned that a ra-
34. Id. at 1297.
35. Id. at 1301.
36. Id. at 1297.
37. Id. at 1304.
38. Id. at 1302.
39. Williams v. Morgan, (Williams IV), 378 F.3d 1232, 1233 (11th Cir. 2004).
40. Id. at 1234.
41. Id. at 1236.
42. Id.
6
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tional basis analysis would be inapplicable had the Supreme Court
sought to establish a broader fundamental right in sexual privacy.43
The court of appeals also took issue with how the district court
framed the constitutional issue on remand. Although they cited with
approval the initial formulation, the court went on to say that the dis-
trict court abandoned this limited framing and thus reviewed the issue
too broadly as a right to sexual privacy rather than a right to use sex-
ual devices." On this basis, the court found that the district court
impermissibly extended the potential scope and bounds of its holding
into areas of conduct that had been and continued to be legitimately
prohibited.45 The court reversed the district court's decision, finding
that no fundamental right existed for the use of sexual devices.4 6 The
court rejected the plaintiffs' argument to redefine the constitutional
right to privacy to cover the commercial distribution of sex toys.47
The court left open the question of whether public morality remained
a sufficient rational basis to justify the constitutionality of Alabama's
statute after the decision in Lawrence.48
On February 22, 2005, the United States Supreme Court denied a
petition for writ of certiorari in the case.4 9
On March 15, 2006, the United States District Court, on remand
from the court of appeals, took up the issue of whether Alabama's law
had a rational basis and remained good law after Lawrence. The dis-
trict court acknowledged the Supreme Court's language in Lawrence
indicating that a state's traditional view of a "particular practice as
immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the
practice."5 However, the court also found that the Eleventh Circuit
had continued to uphold the viability of public morality as a rational
basis for legislation post-Lawrence.5'
Ultimately, the district court reasoned that "[t]o hold that public
morality can never serve as a rational basis for legislation after Law-
rence would cause [the] 'massive disruption of the current social or-
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1239. "[T]he district court's initial opinion 'narrowly framed the analysis as the
question whether the concept of a constitutionally protected right to privacy protects an individ-
ual's liberty to use sexual devices when engaging in lawful, private, sexual activity.' On appeal
we affirmed this formulation .. " Id. at 1239.
45. Id. at 1239-40.
46. Id. at 1250.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1238.
49. Williams v. King, 543 U.S. 1152 (2005) denying cert. to Williams v. Attorney Gen. of
Ala., 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004).
50. Williams v. King (Williams V), 420 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1247 (N.D. Ala. 2006) (quoting
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
51. See id. at 1248.
7
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der"' predicted by Justice Scalia in his dissent to Lawrence.52 The
court indicated its unwillingness to set such a disruption in motion.
Rather, the court considered whether the decision in Lawrence, as ap-
plied specifically to the Alabama statute, was sufficient to strike it
down.53 The court interpreted the Lawrence decision as recognition
by the Supreme Court that the criminalization of certain acts served to
reinforce a "vicious cycle of distancing and stigma that preserve[d] the
equilibrium of oppression" among societal groups.54 In the district
court's view, because the Lawrence case dealt with the criminalization
of homosexual acts subject to the kind of distancing and stigma the
Supreme Court sought not to reinforce, their holding was appropriate.
However, the district court found that such an interpretation did not
benefit the plaintiffs in Williams nor did it justify a similar holding.55
The court distinguished Williams V from Lawrence by finding that
the Lawrence majority limited the scope of the holding to the single
consideration of "two adults.., engaged in [private, consensual,] sex-
ual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle."56 The Alabama stat-
ute, by comparison, was "not limited to private sexual conduct, or...
any other activities ... within the private lives of consenting adults."57
As a result, the court found that their case did not fit within the mold
of Lawrence and thus upheld the constitutionality of the Alabama
statute.58 The court held that public morality remained a viable ra-
tional basis for determining the constitutionality of the Alabama stat-
ute despite the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence.59
III. BACKGROUND
A. Historical Development: Right of Privacy
"While not specified in the Federal Constitution, the right of pri-
vacy has been recognized by the Supreme Court as a distinct constitu-
tional right protecting privacy against unlawful government
intrusion."60 Although the Supreme Court has held that the right to
privacy is not absolute, the Court has recognized a fundamental right
52. Id. at 1249-1250 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 591 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
53. See id. at 1250.
54. Id. (quoting Lawrence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" That
Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. Rav. 1893, 1896 (2004)).
55. See id. at 1253.
56. Williams v. King (Williams V), 420 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1253 (N.D. Ala. 2006) (quoting
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (majority opinion)).
57. See id.
58. Id. at 1254.
59. Id.
60. Ernest H. Schopler, Annotation, Supreme Court's Views as to the Federal Legal Aspects
of the Right of Privacy, 43 L. Ed. 2d 871, § 3 (2006).
8
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in matters of procreation, contraception and other intimate family re-
lationships.61 With the Lawrence decision, the Court extended that
recognition to private consensual homosexual relationships.
Griswold v. Connecticut6" initiated the Court's review of the right to
privacy as it relates to sexual conduct. Appellant Griswold challenged
the constitutionality of a Connecticut law that prohibited the use of
contraceptives. 63 The appellant, a licensed physician who operated a
planned-parenthood center, gave information, instruction and medical
advice to married couples regarding contraception. 64 He was charged
and found guilty as an accessory under the Connecticut law.65
Griswold argued that the statute in question violated the constitu-
tional rights of married persons. The Supreme Court indicated that
the specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, or im-
plied rights, that create zones of privacy into which the government
should not intrude.66 Citing Boyd v. United States, the Court identi-
fied that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments protect against all govern-
mental invasions of "a man's home and the privacies of life."' 67 Citing
Mapp v. Ohio, the Court reiterated that the Fourth Amendment cre-
ated a right to privacy "no less important than any other right care-
fully and particularly reserved to the people., 68 Such precedent, the
Court reasoned, "bears witness that the right of privacy which presses
for recognition here is a legitimate one."69
In reaching its decision, the Court focused on the nature of the rela-
tionship in question. They found that the case involved a relationship
lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental consti-
tutional guarantees. Because the law concerned the forbidding of the
use of contraceptives rather than regulation of their manufacture or
distribution, it caused a "maximum destructive impact on that rela-
tionship."7 ° In particular, the Court saw the provisions of the statute
as impermissibly imposing on the marital relationship. Describing
marriage as a right older than the Bill of Rights, the Court held that
the Connecticut statute was unconstitutional.
In Eisenstadt v. Baird,7 1 the Supreme Court considered sexual pri-
vacy beyond the context of the marital relationship. In Eisenstadt, ap-
61. See id. § 4.
62. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
63. Id. at 481.
64. Id. at 480.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 484.
67. Id. (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
68. See id. at 485 (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961)).
69. See id.
70. Id.
71. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
9
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pellee William Baird was convicted under a Massachusetts law for
giving a young woman a package of contraceptive foam during the
course of delivering a lecture on contraception.72 The recipient of the
foam was an unmarried adult woman.7 3 The statute prohibited distri-
bution of contraceptives and distinguished between three classes of
individuals, allowing married persons to legally obtain contraceptives
but prohibiting single persons from doing SO. 74
While recognizing that the Fourteenth Amendment does not deny
to the States the power to treat different classes of persons in different
ways, the Court found that the Equal Protection Clause of that
amendment does "deny to the States the power to legislate that differ-
ent treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into different
classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the object of that
statute., 75 The question, as the Court saw it under Eisenstadt, was
"whether there [was] some ground of difference that rationally ex-
plain[ed] the different treatment accorded married and unmarried
persons under the Massachusetts [statute]. 76
The Court recognized that "if [they] were to conclude that the Mas-
sachusetts statute impinge[d] [on] the fundamental freedoms [identi-
fied] in Griswold, [any consideration of] the statutory classifications
would have to be not merely rationally related to a valid public pur-
pose but necessary to the achievement of a compelling state inter-
est."' 77 The Court reviewed the possible state interests of deterring
pre-marital sex, enforcing the state's criminal prohibition on fornica-
tion, and protecting the health needs of the community and concluded
that the statute on its face did not serve to meet any of those state
interests.78
The Court finally considered whether the statute could be upheld
simply as a prohibition on contraception. 79 Analyzing a potential pro-
hibition on contraception on the basis of the state's interest in preserv-
ing morality, the Court found that such a view of morality conflicted
with "fundamental human rights."8 However, the Court declined to
extend its analysis of the case into this area.81 Instead, the Court rea-
soned that regardless of whatever right an individual may have to ac-
72. Id. at 440.
73. Id. at 440 n.1.
74. Id. at 442.
75. Id. at 446-47.
76. Id. at 447.
77. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 447 n.7.
78. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. 438.
79. Id. at 452.
80. Id. at 453.
81. Id.
10
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cess contraceptives, those "rights must be the same for the unmarried
and the married alike. 82
The Court found that "if under Griswold the distribution of contra-
ceptives to married persons cannot be prohibited, [then] a ban on dis-
tribution to unmarried persons would be equally impermissible. '' s3
The Court reasoned that even though Griswold dealt with a right of
privacy in the context of a marital relationship, such a right is ulti-
mately "[that] of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into [such personal] matters...
[as] whether [or not] to bear ... children." 4
The Court held that if Griswold stood for the proposition that use
of contraceptives may not be barred but distribution could, under the
Equal Protection Clause, the state could not consistently "outlaw dis-
tribution to unmarried but not to married persons."85 In particular,
the Court cited Railway Express Agency v. New York wherein that
court made the point that:
The framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not forget today,
that there is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and
unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law
which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed gener-
ally. Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effec-
tively as to allow those officials to pick and choose only a few to whom
they will apply legislation and thus to escape the political retribution
that might be visited upon them if larger numbers were affected.
Courts can take no better measure to assure that laws will be just than
to require that laws be equal in operation. 6
On this basis, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the
court of appeals in declaring the Massachusetts law unconstitutional.8 7
The decision in Roe v. Wade88 demonstrated the Court's recognition
that an individual's sexual privacy right is not absolute. Jane Roe, a
single woman, instituted action against the District Attorney seeking a
declaratory judgment that "Texas criminal abortion statutes were un-
constitutional on their face."89 Roe asserted "that the Texas statutes
were unconstitutionally vague and abridged her right of personal pri-
vacy ...... "90 Roe cited Griswold as recognizing her right of personal
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 454.
86. Id. (quoting Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-113 (1949) (Jack-
son, J., concurring)).
87. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 455-56.
88. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
89. Id. at 120.
90. Id.
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and sexual privacy protected under the Bill of Rights or its
penumbras. 91
The Court reviewed three purported bases for the enactment of
criminal abortion laws: a social concern to discourage illicit sexual
conduct; a concern over the hazardous nature of abortion as a medical
procedure; and a concern over the protection of prenatal life.92 The
Court found that prohibitions against abortion often do little to pre-
vent illicit sex and modern medical techniques have made the proce-
dure relatively safe.9 3 In regard to the question of preserving prenatal
life, the Court found that such contentions had been sharply disputed
by the absence of legislative history bearing out that concern.94
The Court reiterated that although the Constitution does not explic-
itly mention any right of privacy, "the Court has recognized that a
right of personal privacy or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of
privacy does exist under the Constitution."95 This right, the Court
reasoned, was "broad enough to encompass a woman's decision of
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."96 However, the Court
held that the right is not absolute. 97 Some state regulation is appropri-
ate.98 "At some point in pregnancy, [the] respective interests [of the
mother and those of the state in safeguarding health and protecting
human life] become sufficiently compelling to sustain regulation of the
... abortion decision." 99
Accordingly, the Court reasoned that a "pregnant woman cannot be
isolated in her privacy."1 0 The Court considered the situation of
abortion as "inherently different from [that of] martial intimacy...
[and] procreation ... ."'0' At some point, the state's interest in pro-
tecting the health of the mother and in protecting the potentiality of
human life becomes compelling." 2 At that point, state regulation of
abortion may be justified. 103 However, because the Texas "statute
[made] no distinction between abortions performed early in preg-
nancy and those performed later," it was held unconstitutional. 1 4
91. Id. at 129 (citing Griswold v, Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
92. Id. at 147-50.
93. Id. at 148-50.
94. Id. at 151.
95. Id. at 152.
96. Id. at 153.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 154.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 159.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 162-63.
103. Id. at 163-64.
104. Id. at 164.
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Carey v. Population Services International"5 is as significant for
what the Court did not hold as for what they did. Like Roe, Carey
continued to define the limits of sexual privacy as a fundamental right.
But, the Court declined to extend their analysis of sexual privacy be-
yond matters of procreation. Carey involved a New York statute that
made it "a crime for (1) any person to sell or distribute any contracep-
tive of any kind to a minor under the age of 16 years; (2) anyone other
than a licensed pharmacist to distribute contraceptives to persons 16
or over; and (3) anyone, including licensed pharmacists, to advertise
or display contraceptives. ' 10 6
Appellee Population Services International was a non-profit corpo-
ration which disseminated birth control information and services, in-
cluding the mail-order retail sale of contraceptive devices. 10 7 In
addition to Population Services International, the appellees in this
case included Population Planning Associates, Inc. (PPA), and a New
York resident who alleged that the statute inhibited his access to con-
traceptive devices and information. 108 The Court decided the consti-
tutionality issue based on Population Planning Associates' standing.
Quoting Craig v. Boren, 0 9 the Court found that "PPA is among the
'vendors and those in like positions [who] have been uniformly per-
mitted to resist efforts at restricting their operations by acting as advo-
cates for the rights of third parties who seek access to their market or
function.""' 0 The Court, citing Roe v. Wade, acknowledged that a
right of personal privacy exists under the Constititution." l The Court
went on to point out, however, that this "constitutionally protected
right of privacy does not ... automatically invalidate every state regu-
lation" regarding contraceptive choice." 2 The court stated that "[t]he
business of manufacturing and selling contraceptives may be regulated
in ways that do not infringe protected individual choices.""13
The Court cited the limiting language in Roe v. Wade in recognizing
that "at some point [the state's interest] 'become[s] sufficiently com-
pelling to sustain regulation. ' ""' However, the Court pointed out
105. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
106. Id. at 681.
107. Id. at 682.
108. Id.
109. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
110. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. at 684 (quoting Craig v. Boren, 439 U.S. at
192-97).
111. Id. at 684.
112. Id. at 685-86.
113. Id. at 686.
114. Id. (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154-56 (1973) (discussing that a state's interest
in governing the abortion decision must be "compelling" and "narrowly drawn to express only
those interests." )).
13
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that the right preserved in cases such as Griswold and Eisenstadt was
not limited to the use of contraceptives alone.
Read in light of its progeny, the teaching of Griswold is that the Con-
stitution protects individual decisions in matters of childbearing from
unjustified intrusion by the [s]tate. Restrictions on the distribution of
contraceptives clearly burden the freedom to make such decisions. A
total prohibition against sale of contraceptives, for example, would in-
trude upon individual decisions in matters of procreation and contra-
ception as harshly as a direct ban on their use. Indeed, in practice, a
prohibition against all sales, since more easily and less offensively en-
forced, might have an even more devastating effect upon the freedom
to choose contraception."15
Thus, when a statute limits access to the means affecting a decision
on contraception it is subject to the same compelling state interest
standard as is applied to statutes that prohibit the decision entirely." 6
The Court concluded that the New York statute did not satisfy a
compelling state interest in restricting access to contraception as a
constitutionally protected right in decisions on matters of childbear-
ing.117 The Court stopped short of holding that a state regulation
must meet a strict scrutiny standard whenever it implicates "sexual
freedom" or "affects adult sexual relations."' 8 Rather, the Court
stated, such a standard is applied "only when it burdens an individ-
ual's right to decide to prevent conception or terminate pregnancy by
substantially limiting access to the means effectuating that deci-
sion. '""' The Court observed that they "ha[d] not definitively an-
swered the difficult question whether and to what extent the
Constitution prohibits state statutes from regulating private, consen-
sual, sexual behavior among adults."'' °
The Bowers v. Hardwick 2' decision followed the limits of analysis
the Court established in Griswold, Eisenstadt, Roe and Carey. Each of
these cases had only analyzed an individual's sexual privacy rights in
the context of a heterosexual relationship (i.e. one founded in procre-
ation). So, too, did Bowers.
115. Carey, 431 U.S. at 687.
116. Id. at 688 (discussing the application of the compelling state interest test to statutes
which burden an individual's right to either "prevent conception or terminate pregnancy by
substantially limiting access to the means of effectuating that decision").
117. See id. at 690 (holding that the states' interests, that "young people not sell contracep-
tives", to prevent tampering with the product, and to facilitate "enforcement of the other provi-
sions of the statute.., hardly justify the statute's incursion into constitutionally protected rights,
and in any event the statute is obviously not substantially related to any goal of preventing
young people from selling contraceptives ... [nor] as a quality control device.").
118. See id. at 689 n.5.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
14
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 1 [2006], Art. 7
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol29/iss1/7
2006]WHERE SEXUAL PRIVACY MEETS PUBLIC MORALITY 141
In Bowers, respondent Hardwick was charged with violating a
Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy. 2 Hardwick brought suit chal-
lenging the constitutionality of the statute insofar as it criminalized
consensual sodomy.'2 3 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed the district court's decision granting the defendant's motion to
dismiss the case. Relying on Griswold, Eisenstadt and Roe, the court
of appeals held that "the Georgia statute violated [Hardwick's] funda-
mental rights because his homosexual activity [wa]s a private and inti-
mate association that was beyond the reach of state regulation. ' 12 4
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review whether the statute
violated the fundamental rights of homosexuals. 125 The Court charac-
terized the issue as "whether the Federal Constitution confer[red] a
fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence
invalidate[d] ... [any state law making] such conduct illegal."'21 6 The
Court distinguished the cases upon which the court of appeals relied
in reaching its decision. The Court found that none of the rights an-
nounced in Griswold, Eisenstadt or Roe bore any resemblance to the
claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts of sod-
omy that was asserted in the present case.127 In short, the Court
found no connection between family, marriage, or procreation and ho-
mosexual activity. 128
Contrary to Hardwick's argument, the Court found morality to be a
sufficiently rational basis upon which to impose criminal restrictions
on sodomy. 129 The Court was not persuaded that the majority senti-
ments about the morality of homosexuality was inadequate to invali-
date existing sodomy laws. 130 Finding no violation of a fundamental
right and the presence of a legitimate state interest in preserving mo-
rality, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and
upheld the Georgia sodomy law.' 31
B. An Examination: Lawrence v. Texas
Lawrence v. Texas 13 2 broadened an individual's sexual privacy
rights beyond those existing in heterosexual relationships only. In
Lawrence, petitioner John Lawrence was arrested, charged and con-
122. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984).
123. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188.
124. Id. at 189.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 190.
127. Id. at 190-91.
128. Id. at 191.
129. Id. at 196.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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victed of engaging in deviate sexual intercourse with another person
of the same sex. 13 3 The applicable state law in Texas categorized devi-
ate sexual intercourse to include sodomy. 134
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the
Texas statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, whether the petitioner's criminal conviction violated his
interest in liberty and privacy, and whether Bowers v. Hardwick
should be overruled. The Court concluded that the Bowers decision
failed to appreciate the extent of liberty at stake. 135 The Court con-
cluded that "when sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct
with another person, the conduct can be but one element in the per-
sonal bond that is more enduring." '136 Basing its analysis on the deci-
sions in Griswold, Eisenstadt and Roe, the Court expressed the
sentiment that the liberty protected by the Constitution allows homo-
sexual persons the right to make the choice of intimate conduct within
the confines of their personal bond.'37 While recognizing that such a
right is limited, the Court found that the holdings of these cases ex-
tended the right to make certain decisions regarding sexual conduct
beyond the marital relationship. 138
In limiting the scope of its inquiry, the Supreme Court found that
the Bowers court relied on the long-standing tradition of condemning
homosexual conduct as immoral as a rational basis for upholding the
Georgia statute and that such basis was not sufficient.'3 9 Rather, the
Court saw the Lawrence case as a question of "whether the majority
may use the power of the [s]tate to enforce [their views of morality]
on the whole society through operation of a criminal law."' 140 The
Lawrence court found that it could not.
The Court hastened to point out that its decision was not based on
the argument of equal protection asserted by petitioners and some
amici. Although the statute in Lawrence only prohibited same-sex
sodomy, the Court chose to remove the question of how its decision
would have been affected if the statute were drawn differently.14' The
133. Id. at 563.
134. Id. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (2003) invalidated by Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003) (providing that a person commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual
intercourse with another individual of the same sex). "The statute defme[d] 'deviate sexual in-
tercourse' as follows: (A) any contact between any part of the genitals of one person and the
mouth or anus of another person; or (B) the penetration of the genitals or the anus of another
person with an object." Id. at 563.
135. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 565.
139. Id. at 571.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 575.
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Court concluded that a continued reliance on the precedent of Bowers
"demean[ed] the lives of homosexual persons" and should therefore
be overruled. 42
Finally, the Court agreed with Justice Stevens' analysis in Bowers
wherein he stated that a state's traditional view of a practice as im-
moral "is not a sufficient reason to uphold a law prohibiting [the]
practice" and that "individual decisions concerning the intimacies of
their physical relationship ... are a form of liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." '143 In sum, the
Court concluded that the state cannot "demean [the] existence or con-
trol [the] destiny of [a private homosexual relationship] by making
their private sexual conduct a crime. "144
IV. ANALYSIS
Griswold was the first case to recognize an individual's sexual rela-
tionship with another as one lying within a zone of privacy created by
fundamental constitutional guarantees.1 45 Griswold, however, limited
itself to the marital relationship. Through the progression of Eisen-
stadt, Roe and Carey, the United States Supreme Court broadened its
recognition of privacy rights to include sexual relationships outside
marriage. But, none of these cases ever ventured beyond conduct that
had its foundations in procreation, and hence never sought to define
sexual relationships as personal bonds, the conduct of which "can be
but one element.' 46 Bowers followed this line of cases and the Court
was unwilling to recognize a fundamental right to engage in homosex-
ual sodomy.147
The Lawrence decision explicitly overruled Bowers, but not because
the Court recognized a fundamental privacy right in homosexual con-
duct. Rather, the Court recognized both a boundary and an intersec-
tion between the right of privacy and socially acceptable sexual
conduct. In deciding Lawrence, the Court expanded the boundary of
privacy to include consensual, private, adult homosexual relationships.
However, the Court did not eliminate society's right to legislate on the
basis of public morality where sexual conduct itself intersects with so-
ciety's standards of acceptability.
In his dissent 48 of the Lawrence decision, Justice Scalia envisioned
the Lawrence case creating a massive disruption of the current social
142. Id.
143. Id. at 577-78.
144. Id. at 578.
145. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
146. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
147. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).
148. See supra notes 3 and 4.
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order by the breadth of its holding. In anticipation of a complete dis-
carding of morality as a legitimate state interest, he ironically cited the
Eleventh Circuit's first decision in Williams II as an example of how
morality had been used in the past to uphold the "ancient proposition
that a governing majority's belief that certain sexual behavior is 'im-
moral and unacceptable' constitutes a rational basis for regulation." '149
Justice Scalia feared that with Lawrence, state regulation of sexual
conduct based on morality would be a thing of the past. Justice
Scalia's fears did not materialize. In fact, the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals ultimately provided the direction to the district court in
Williams IV that morality is not to be abandoned post-Lawrence.
Lawrence was decided based on the recognition that Texas law in-
fringed upon a personal relationship. 150 The Court readily recognized
that their decision did not involve "whether the government must give
formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek
to enter."'1 51 Moreover, the Court specifically eliminated from its
holding any sexual conduct involving minors, those who might be in-
jured or coerced, public conduct or prostitution. 152
The plaintiffs in the William v. King cases argued that the Alabama
statute violated their fundamental rights of privacy. 153 The court in
Williams I found no evidentiary basis, under the Glucksberg standard,
for holding that their case involved a fundamental right of privacy.154
In completing their rational basis analysis, the court saw no difficulty
in retaining public and social morality as a legitimate state interest.
Instead, the court initially found the statute unconstitutional because
it was deemed arbitrary and overly broad.155 The district court in Wil-
liams V recognized that the constitutional boundaries for the plain-
tiffs' asserted privacy rights, even after Lawrence was not completely
clear.' 56 The district court characterized its understanding of the right
to engage in private, consensual, sexual activity common to a homo-
sexual lifestyle as "arguably" a fundamental right recognized by the
Supreme Court. 5
7
The court of appeals decision in Williams V, after Lawrence had
been decided, brought the significance of the Williams cases clearly
into focus. In Williams III, the district court on remand, found that a
broad-based fundamental right to sexual privacy existed under the
149. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 589.
150. Id. at 567 (emphasis added).
151. Id. at 578.
152. Id.
153. Williams v. King (Williams V), 420 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1225 (N.D. Ala. 2006).
154. Id. at 1234.
155. Id. at 1235.
156. Id. at 1226.
157. Id. at 1228-29.
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federal Constitution. However, the court of appeals (in Williams IV)
reversed the district court and reasoned that the Lawrence court had
not in fact recognized such a fundamental right. On remand again, in
William V, the district court articulated the distinction in the Law-
rence decision when they identified the explicit limitations the Law-
rence court placed on its holding but also recognized that within those
confines "the moral views of a governing majority may not be used to
define the meaning of the relationship or to set its boundaries. "158
Some, like Justice Scalia, have argued that Lawrence stands for the
idea that morality is no longer a legitimate state interest in matters of
sexual conduct.159 The district court in Williams V recognized, how-
ever, that morality, as a legitimate state interest, is limited only where
the conduct in question is but one element of the private, consensual
adult relationship (homosexual or heterosexual), the privacy of which
Lawrence sought to protect. In so doing, the Williams V court reveals
the underlying weaknesses of both Justice Stevens' argument in Bow-
ers and Justice Scalia's argument in Lawrence. Neither argument
holds true. As the Williams V court stated, laws are often based on
moral standards.161 Moral standards have not and will not be aban-
doned in the law. On the other hand, the recognition of a sexual pri-
vacy right in the context of a consensual relationship negates morality
as a rational basis for state legislation involving conduct which is inti-
mately connected to that relationship.1 6' Lawrence extended the
reach of privacy beyond marriage and contraception - that is, to in-
clude the homosexual relationship. However, the Williams V decision
demonstrates that a constitutional right of privacy has not been ex-
tended to every form of private sexual conduct or every private sexual
relationship to the extent that morality is no longer a valid state
interest.
In the end, the district court in Williams V found it easy to distin-
guish Lawrence because their case was not encapsulated within the
private sexual relationship that Lawrence sought to recognize and
whose privacy the Supreme Court sought to protect.1 62 In reaching its
conclusions, the Williams V court demonstrated that, outside the lim-
ited relationship boundaries established by the Lawrence court, mo-
rality remains a valid rational basis for state regulation of sexual
conduct.
158. Id. at 1246-47 (emphasis added).
159. See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 589 (2003).
160. Williams v. King (Williams V), 420 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1248 (N.D. Ala. 2006).
161. Id. at 1250 (emphasis added).
162. Id. at 1253-54.
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V. CONCLUSION
Lawrence v. Texas established that private, consensual, adult homo-
sexual relationships may not be intruded upon by government regula-
tion that criminalizes their conduct. As a result, Lawrence moved the
Court beyond the traditional procreative basis recognized in Gris-
wold, Eisenstadt, and Roe as the foundation for analyzing an individ-
ual's constitutional right to sexual privacy.
Lawrence stands for the idea that prohibitions on sexual conduct,
even morally unacceptable conduct, are not a permissible means for
the state to infringe on the privacy of an individual's intimate relation-
ship with another person. However, the right to sexual privacy, heter-
osexual or homosexual, does not extend to every state regulation. In
other words, sexual conduct in many contexts may not be constitution-
ally protected merely by an appeal to one's privacy rights. Outside of
the intimate relationship recognized by Lawrence, states continue to
be free to regulate the boundaries of sexual conduct to the extent that
the legislation rationally serves to protect the state's legitimate
interests.
One of those interests is the preservation of social or public moral-
ity. State legislatures need not abandon their moral compass in the
wake of the Lawrence decision. Lawrence explicitly excludes its appli-
cation in situations of sexual conduct involving minors, coercion, pub-
lic conduct or prostitution. The significance of William v. King
(Williams V) is that it recognizes that this explicit list of limitations is
not exhaustive. Sexual conduct outside that which is intimately reflec-
tive of, and an integral component of, a private, consensual adult rela-
tionship, including a homosexual one, continues to be subject to the
state's interest in public morality under rational basis review.
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